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ABSTRACT
Emerging Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs) bring a unique
challenge to the security community, namely persistent se-
curity. As NVM-based memories are expected to restore
their data after recovery, the security metadata must be re-
covered as well. However, persisting all affected security
metadata on each memory write would significantly degrade
performance and exacerbate the write endurance problem.
Moreover, recovery time can increase significantly (up to
hours for practical memory sizes) when security metadata are
not updated strictly.
Counter trees are used in state-of-the-art commercial se-
cure processors, e.g., Intel’s Safe Guard Extension (SGX).
Counter trees have a unique challenge due to the inability
to recover the whole tree from leaves. Thus, to ensure re-
coverability, all updates to the tree must be persisted, which
can be tens of additional writes on each write. The state-
of-art scheme, Anubis, enables recoverability but incurs an
additional write per cache eviction, i.e., reduces lifetime to
approximately half. Additionally, Anubis degrades perfor-
mance significantly in many cases. In this paper, we propose
Phoenix, a practical novel scheme which relies on elegantly
reproducing the cache content before a crash, however with
minimal overheads. Our evaluation results show that Phoenix
reduces persisting security metadata overhead writes from
87% extra writes (for Anubis) to less than write-back com-
pared to an encrypted system without recovery, thus improv-
ing the NVM lifetime by 2x. Overall Phoenix performance
is better than the baseline, unlike Anubis which adds 7.9%
(max of 35%) performance overhead.
1. INTRODUCTION
Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs) are emerging as promis-
ing contenders to the DRAM, and promise to provide ter-
abytes of persistent data capacity that can be accessed using
regular load and store operations [14, 15]. Secure NVM
systems commonly aim to protect confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of the memory. While data persistency is
an attractive feature that enables persistent applications, e.g.,
filesystems and checkpointing, it also facilitates data rema-
nence attacks [2, 7, 23, 25]. To protect the NVM data at
rest, encryption becomes a necessity. Encryption targets the
confidentiality among the security requirements. However,
encrypting the data introduces the overhead of encryption
metadata, which needs to be persisted to ensure secure and
functional recovery [1,5,16,23]. In state-of-the-art secure pro-
cessor systems [2, 4, 9, 20, 25], the counter-mode encryption
is used due to its security and performance advantages.
To protect the integrity of encryption counters associated
with each memory block (64 bytes), a Tree of Counters (ToC)
or a Merkele Tree (MT) is usually used to verify the integrity
of the counters themselves. ToCs are a form of integrity trees
with security advantages over the MT since each counter in
ToC is used in generating two different MAC values. More-
over, the trees of counters feature parallel updates due to their
structure, which allows pre-computing all updates of a tree
in parallel on each memory write. These advantages of trees
of counters led to their deployment in commercial secure
processors, e.g., Intel’s Safe Guard Extension (SGX) support.
Unfortunately, due to the nature of these trees, they cannot
be recovered from leaves. Thus, and unlike regular MTs, it is
insufficient to just rely on persisting the leaves and rebuilding
the tree after a crash [1]. Meanwhile, strictly persisting tree
updates for each memory write can incur a significant write
overhead, hence reducing the memory lifetime and signif-
icantly degrading the performance. Finally, rebuilding the
tree after a crash can take hours if we are unable to identify
the subset of tree nodes that have been possibly lost. Recent
work [1] has demonstrated that a practical NVM size (e.g.,
8TB) would require 7.8 hours for recovery. On the other
hand, high-availability systems have stringent requirements
of 99.999% (five nines rule), i.e., the system can sustain a
total of 7.8 hours down time only once each 89 years.
The state-of-the-art scheme, Anubis [1], addresses the re-
covery time problem by persistently tracking the addresses
of security metadata currently in the cache and thus limiting
recovery of metadata to these addresses only. By doing so,
Anubis no longer needs to rebuild the whole tree but only a
subset of nodes that have been potentially updated and lost
due to a crash. To enable ToC’s recovery, Anubis uses a
lazy update scheme while persisting each cache update to the
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NVM. Thus, Anubis only needs to verify that the shadowed
cache (in NVM) has not been tampered with after a crash
and then load that shadow cache content into the cache. By
doing so, Anubis is able to recover the ToC but at the cost of
a write to the shadow region on each security metadata cache
update. Although the first solution capable of recovering ToC
integrity trees, Anubis’ overhead can limit its deployment.
NVMs’ limited write endurance is perhaps the most chal-
lenging part towards its wide adoption [2, 3, 4, 16, 23, 24, 25].
In fact, encryption significantly exacerbates the write en-
durance issue due to the encryption’s diffusion property [25].
Meanwhile, the state-of-the-art solution, Anubis [1], incurs
87% write overhead when used with ToC integrity trees, and
systems using Anubis are expected to have almost half the
lifetime span of systems without Anubis but no recoverability.
Moreover, NVM writes are power hungry and have latency
much higher than the read latency [7,13,25]. Obviously, dou-
bling the write bandwidth, as incurred by Anubis, limits its
deployment and hence leaves NVMs in unrecoverable state.
In this paper, we aim to bridge the gap between recover-
ability and high-performance for secure NVM systems. We
mainly focus on ToC integrity trees, due to its commercial
adoption (Intel processors) and security advantages, includ-
ing resistance to tampering and replay attacks. To bridge the
aforementioned gap, we propose Phoenix, a novel memory
controller design that achieves both recoverability and high-
performance of secure NVM systems. Phoenix is based on
our observation that reconstructing the exact content of the
security metadata cache after a crash does not require shadow-
ing all updates to the cache, i.e., allowing imprecise content
addresses shadow of the metadata cache could be sufficient.
In fact, we can reconstruct the exact lost cache state after
recovery by recalculating the potentially lost values and then
verify the integrity of the reconstructed cache. By relying
on value recovery of the tree leaves only a small subset of
updates to the cache need to be persisted in memory. Mean-
while, we still can verify that the recovered cache content
reflects exactly the same cache state before the crash. Our
optimization, realized in Phoenix+, relaxes persisting encryp-
tion counters on eviction, to only persist encryption counters
on the N-th write, reducing Phoenix’s overhead significantly.
While prior schemes, e.g., Anubis [1], lazily-update the
metadata cache which has its updates strictly shadowed to
NVM, Phoenix allows the use of lazy-update metadata cache
scheme but without strictly shadowing each update to the
NVM. Phoenix is mainly based on four observations. First,
most of the updates to metadata cache in a lazy-update scheme
are for leaves. Second, leaf nodes are the least likely to be
evicted, as they are going to be used frequently for integrity
verification. Third, leaf nodes can be recovered using the
encryption counter recovery schemes. Fourth, intermediate
ToC nodes can be persisted at their location, and shadowing
their addresses is sufficient for recovery, while ensuring the
integrity by calculating the root of a small MT covering the
cache. However, shadowing leaves updates to memory might
be unnecessary if we can have the following: 1 a mecha-
nism to verify the most-recent cache state including leaves
but without necessarily shadowing them, and 2 the ability to
recover leave updates. To do so, Phoenix elegantly employs
relaxed counter recovery schemes which were used in the
context of generic recovery of counters, but to recover the
content of cache in a lazy-update scheme.
To evaluate Phoenix, we use Gem5 [6], a full-system cycle-
level simulator. By running representative workloads from
the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite, we observe a reduction
of write overhead from 87% for Anubis—Phoenix has even
less writes than write-back scheme, i.e., improves lifetime by
almost 1.9x. Moreover, Phoenix has an average performance
that is even less than write-back scheme, whereas Anubis
incurs 7.9% (max of 35%) performance overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in
Section 2, we discuss the background and motivation of our
work. In Section 3, we discuss the design of Phoenix. In
Section 4, we discuss our evaluation methodology followed
by our evaluation. We review the related work in Section 5.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section 6.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we review background and related concepts,
and motivate for our work. In particular, we start by defining
the threat model, followed by all relevant concepts.
2.1 Threat Model
Similar to the state-of-the-art approaches [2, 10, 16, 18,
22, 23], our threat model considers the processor chip to be
the secure boundary. The processor contains the root of the
integrity tree and the encryption key, where everything out-
side the processor is considered untrusted. We assume an
attacker is capable of performing passive and active attacks
including bus snooping and replaying memory packets, can
scan the memory contents, and may tamper with memory
contents. We also assume the attacker can perform attacks
while the system is either on or off. Access pattern leakage
attacks, electromagnetic (EM) inference attacks, and differ-
ential power analysis attacks are, however, beyond the scope
of this work.
2.2 Counter Mode Encryption
One of the major security vulnerabilities of NVM systems
is the data remanence problem. Therefore, NVM is usually
paired with encryption for data protection. The state-of-the-
art secure processors (e.g., Intel Xeon Processor E-family)
use counter-mode encryption, shown in Figure 1, since it pro-
vides strong defenses against a range of attacks (e.g., snoop-
ing, known plain-text, and dictionary-based). Moreover, the
counter-mode has a smaller encryption/decryption overhead
compared to other schemes due to overlapped latency of data
fetching and one-time-pad generation [2, 4, 25]. For each
write to a data block, its associated counter will be incre-
mented by 1. The updated counter is used to generate an
initialization vector and then coupled with a processor key
serve as inputs for the encryption engine to output a One-
Time-Pad (OTP). After being XOR’ed with this OTP, the data
block is encrypted and can be saved in memory. Similarly, a
read request uses the same encryption pad to generate plain-
text for processors but without updating any counter value.
The size and organization of counters vary in different
state-of-the-art schemes. The counters used in ToC are mono-
lithic counters, where each of 56-bit long associated with a
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Figure 1: Counter-Mode Encryption in state-of-the-art
secure memories [2, 23].
data block and one 64B counter cacheline can accommodate
counters for eight 64B memory blocks. Encryption counter
overflow can be costly, and causes long system stalls which
is generally unacceptable [18]. Therefore, the monolithic
counter should be large enough to prevent overflowing, which
means more storage overhead. For encryption/decryption, the
monolithic counter will be padded with a block address to
generate the initialization vector [18]. To encrypt/decrypt the
data, secure processors use AES counter-mode encryption.
Figure 1 shows how counter code encryption works.
Several other state-of-the-art schemes use the split counter
scheme [1, 2, 5, 16, 19, 21, 23], in which each data block is
associated with one per-page major counter and one per-block
minor counter. The major counter is shared by all the blocks
within that page. Encryption/Decryption requires knowing
both major and minor counter values to generate the OTP.
Since each minor counter only accounts for seven bits, and
the major counter for 64 bits, a small storage overhead occurs.
However, when a minor counter overflows, the major counter
is incremented by 1 and the whole page has to be encrypted
using the new major counter [1, 2, 5, 16, 19, 21, 23].
2.3 Integrity Verification
Since the trusted boundaries are limited to the processor
chip, whenever a block is fetched from the memory, the
memory integrity needs to be verified. In state-of-the-art re-
search and secure processors design [1, 5, 18, 23], the Merkle
Tree—one of approaches used for ensuring integrity, is widely
studied and used for memory integrity verification.Basically,
Merkle Tree is an N-ary hash tree where its leaves correspond
to encryption counters for data blocks [18] and every N leaves
will have a hash value calculated based on the counter values.
Similarly, all the intermediate nodes up to the root are con-
structed using the hash value based on its children. The root is
always kept secure; that is, it never leaves the chip. Moreover,
any tamper with a counter leads to the failure of reconstruct-
ing the root. Depending on the tree structure, Merkle trees
can be non-parallelizable (e.g., Bonsai Merkle Tree) or Par-
allelizable (e.g., SGX style counter tree) [1]. Since hashes
in the Bonsai style trees are calculated over the bottom level
hashes, the tree update must be done sequentially. ToC in-
tegrity trees, on the other hand, can perform a parallel update
of the tree, as the MAC values are not calculated over the
below level MAC value. Figure 2 illustrates the organization
of ToC integrity tree where each node is comprised of eight
counters. The MAC values are calculated over these eight
counters and one counter from the parent node as in Figure 2.
A00 A01 A02 A03 A04 A05 A06 A07
B00 B01 B02 B03 B04 B05 B06 B07
Hash
MAC11
C00 C01 C02 C03 C04 C05 C06 C07
Hash
MAC00 C08 C09 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15
Hash
MAC01
Secure Region
56 bit encryption counter 56 bit MAC left over 8 bits
Intermediate
Nodes
Figure 2: SGX style Parallelizable Merkle Tree [10]
2.3.1 Read and Verify
To better understand the verification step in ToC integrity
trees, Figure 2 demonstrates a scenario of verifying counter
C00. Note that C00 falls within a block (64 bytes) that con-
tains counters C00 - C07 in addition to a MAC value. How-
ever, verifying C00 also requires reading B00 in the upper
level, and then calculating the MAC value over C00 - C07
and B00, then compare it with MAC00. However, it is impor-
tant to note that this is assuming B00 is already verified and
cached in the processor chip. However, if B00 is not present
in the processor chip, it must be also verified the same way
before we use it to verify C00.
Clearly, there is an inter-level dependency in the integrity
tree, and missing an updated MAC due to a crash can cause
the whole recovery process to fail.
2.3.2 Write and Update
To better understand how updates propagate through the
ToC integrity tree, let’s take the case of updating C00. For
now, let’s assume that there is no expectation of integrity
tree recovery after a crash. In its simplest form, updating
(incrementing) C00 requires recalculating MAC00 after incre-
menting B00. Similarly, MAC11 will be recalculated with the
incremented B00 and A00 values. One important aspect to
note here is that on each update, the MAC values on the
affected nodes can be calculated in parallel using the incre-
mented counter values. In contrast, and for regular Merkle
Tree, calculating the upper levels requires the MAC value
as an input, hence mandating the serialization of updates
(bottom-up). Thus, ToC trees provide parallelism in updating
the tree mainly because calculating the values of counters
affected on each node can occur in parallel, hence calculating
the corresponding MAC values on each affected node.
2.4 ToC Advantages
ToC provides security advantages over the Merkle tree,
since in the ToC each counter/version is used in the calcula-
tion of two different MAC values, namely, the MAC value in
the same node and the MAC value in the parent node. This,
in turn, makes it harder to perform replay attacks. In ToC
integrity-protected systems, the attacker needs to replay an
old counter value that generates the same MAC value in the
same node, and results in the same nonce in the parent node.
However, in Merkle tree, the attacker only needs to replay
a counter value that generates the same MAC value of the
counter. For example, as shown in Figure 2 if an attacker
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Figure 3: Atomic Persistence of Integrity-Protected NVMs [1, 5].
wants to replay an old value of C03, the value should gen-
erate the same MAC value as MAC00, and should result in
a value that generates the same MAC as MAC11. Moreover,
the new value of B00 should generate the same value in A00,
and the same process is repeated for all the levels of the ToC.
In other words, to successfully perform an attack in a ToC
integrity-protected system, the attacker needs to use a value
that generates the same MAC values for all of the tree levels.
On the other hand, for a Merkle tree integrity-protected sys-
tem, the attacker only needs to use a value that generates the
same MAC value in the parent node, then the parent MAC—
which is basically the same, will be used to generate the upper
levels. Moreover, ToC allows parallel calculation of upper
levels updates, as the updates of upper levels does not depend
on the MAC value of the child level. However, parallelism is
not used when a lazy update scheme is used as we only write
one cacheline and rely on eviction to propagate the updates
to the upper levels.
2.5 Metadata Cache Update Scheme and Re-
coverability in Persistent Memories
Security metadata cache, caching the content of integrity
tree and encryption counters, can be eagerly or lazily updated.
In eager update schemes, each write needs to update all the
related nodes up until the root in the cache. Thus, the root
always reflects the most recent state of the tree and can be
used to verify the memory integrity after recovery. In contrast,
the lazy cache update scheme updates the leaf on each write
and relies on propagating the updates upwardly only after the
eviction of updated nodes. In the lazy update scheme, the
root might still be stale while the metadata cache has the most
recent values. Therefore, lazy update schemes are commonly
paired with systems with no expectation of recovery [1, 5].
In Merkle tree schemes where the tree can be regener-
ated using only the leaves (e.g., in General Merkle Tree), it
requires a long time to rebuild the tree. Once the tree is re-
constructed, the generated root will be compared against the
one inside the processor chip which has been eagerly updated.
In contrast, the lazy update scheme has no way to verify the
integrity of the reconstructed tree since the root is out-of-date;
the root does not reflect the most recent changes to memory
before the crash. However, in the ToC integrity tree, it is
impossible to regenerate the previous state of the tree from
the leaf encryption counters since every intermediate node
contains versions, the updated value of which could be lost
during a crash. Due to such inter-dependency of levels, and
volatile meta-data cache, it is very difficult to recover systems
with ToC even if an eager update scheme is maintained.
While an eager update is suitable to rebuild the Merkle
tree using only the encryption counters, it is not the case
with ToC integrity tree. In ToC integrity tree, each node
contains a MAC value calculated over the node counters and
a nonce from the parent node. This inter-dependencies makes
it very complex to retrieve the lost intermediate nodes during
the recovery process. In lazily updated ToC integrity tree
systems, the root is not enough to verify the integrity of the
memory as it might be stale. Thus, to verify the integrity of
the memory the integrity tree should be restored, while each
node is used to verify the integrity of lower and upper levels.
2.6 Counter Recovery Schemes
Recovering encryption counters, the leaves of Merkle Tree,
is generally considered the first step in recovering the tree.
Prior work on general Merkle Tree [5, 23] explored how
to recover encryption counters after a crash. One solution,
Osiris [23], relies on encrypting Error-Correcting Code (ECC)
written with data. By limiting the number of updates to a
counter before persisting it to memory, e.g., every 4th write, it
can recover the counter used to encrypt the data by relying on
the fact that a large number of errors will be detected by ECC
when a wrong counter is used. By trying multiple counter
values, Osiris can recover the counter used to encrypt the
data. For more details on Osiris, the reader is referred to [23].
While Osiris presents a novel approach that reduces the
overhead of persisting counters significantly, there are many
other competing approaches [16]. For instance, as also dis-
cussed in [23], part of the encryption counter used for en-
cryption can be also written with the data and thus strict the
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persistence of the whole encryption counter can be relaxed.
For the rest of this paper, we assume Osiris can be used,
however, any other counter recovery scheme would work.
2.7 ToC Recovery Schemes
The state-of-the-art scheme, Anubis [1], is the first to en-
able recovering ToC trees without strictly persisting all tree
updates to the memory. Anubis mainly builds upon the obser-
vation that it is sufficient to just recover the state of the cache
before a crash, even if a lazy cache update scheme was used.
In other words, if we can recover the content of the metadata
cache after a crash, to the same content before the crash and
verify it, then it is sufficient. To do the cache recovery part,
Anubis persists security metadata cache updates in the mem-
ory in a region called the shadow region, i.e., writing cache
updates additionally to memory. However, to fit the tag of the
cache block and the block content into 64-byte cache lines,
part of the counters (i.e., most-significant bits) are trimmed
and their updates are persisted immediately. Meanwhile, to
verify the integrity of the shadow cache after a crash, a small
integrity tree protects the shadow region and uses eagerly
updated Merkle tree. The root of the shadow region tree is
updated on each cache update. However, the intermediate
nodes do not need to be persisted; the shadow region tree is
implemented using a general tree where the root can be gen-
erated from the leaves. Thus, after power restoration, Anubis
reads the shadow region and then calculates the root of the
shadow region and compares it with that inside the processor
chip. Note that in Anubis there will be two roots inside the
processor chip, one for the shadow region tree (regular tree)
and the other one (ToC tree) is for the rest of the memory.
Moreover, Anubis keeps two integrity trees, one for the mem-
ory which is the ToC integrity tree, which is updated using
the lazy update scheme, whereas the second one is the small
general Merkle tree covering the shadow region, which is
updated using eager update scheme.
Obviously, Anubis incurs almost double the write band-
width: on each memory write, updating metadata cache needs
to be persisted to memory.
2.8 Atomic Update of Security Metadata
While persisting the security metadata allows the system to
recover after a crash, if the crash happens when the security
metadata and data could not be both persisted will lead the
NVM content to be inconsistent. To ensure the security meta-
data is consistent with the data, the update should be done
atomically. Modern processors provide enough power to flush
the content of the Write Pending Queue (WPQ) when a crash
occurs, and the power to flush the WPQ content is provided
by the Asynchronous DRAM Refresh (ADR) feature [5].
Therefore, all writes that have reached the WPQ are consid-
ered to be persisted. Additional bits, such as READY_BIT or
DONE_BIT can be used to ensure the content of persistent
registers are inserted atomically to the WPQ [5, 16]. Figure
3 shows how atomic updates are done, the encrypted data,
encryption counter, and the updated MT nodes are moved to
persistent registers, then the DONE_BIT is set. After that the
updates are moved atomically to the WPQ, then the data is
written to the NVM, and finally the DONE_BIT is reset and
the entry is removed from the volatile WPQ.
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Figure 4: Anubis extra writes.
2.9 Motivation
The main goal of Phoenix is to provide a practical solution
for recovering ToC integrity trees. Table 1 summarizes the
features of the current solutions in contrast with Phoenix.
While Osiris [23] provides an efficient counter (tree leaves)
recovery scheme, it fails to recover the ToC integrity tree. As
discussed earlier, ToC instances have inter-level dependence,
which makes rebuilding a ToC from the recovered leaves
impossible. Strict persistence schemes require persisting all
tree updates in memory while using an eager update scheme,
i.e., the root reflects the most-recent tree status. Thus, the
strict persistence has a low recovery time, where there is
no need to rebuild tree, although incurs a significant write
overhead and result in performance degradation.
For instance, for an 8TB memory system, strict persis-
tence needs to persist additional 13 writes on each regular
memory write, i.e., reducing NVM lifetime and increasing
write bandwidth by 13x. Clearly, strict persistence is imprac-
tical. Anubis brings down the overhead of strict persistence
significantly, although it is still high. In particular, Anubis
incurs 2x the write bandwidth by persisting each update to
cache in the shadow region. Thus, Anubis reduces the life-
time of NVM systems to almost half of its actual lifetime,
although the lifetime of NVMs is already short, to begin with.
Moreover, NVM writes are slow and power hungry, hence
can significantly degrade the performance and increase the
overall power consumption. Figure 4 shows the overhead of
Anubis scheme, which can limit its deployment, and moti-
vates for this work. In particular, Figure 4 shows the impact
of Anubis on the number of writes. On average Anubis, in-
curs almost 2x the number of writes and average performance
overhead of 7.9% compared to baseline secure NVM with-
out recovery support. The goal of Phoenix is to provide an
NVM-friendly solution that does not incur significant NVM
writes. Thus, Phoenix is proposed as a practical solution that
realizes low-overhead secure and recoverable NVMs.
3. PHOENIX DESIGN
Before delving into the details of Phoenix’s design, we
first discuss the main goals and design principles that inspire
Phoenix. The goal of Phoenix is to enable recovery of ToC
integrity trees with an emphasis on low write overhead. We
realize that any practical solution proposed for NVMs must
have low write overhead. Thus, Phoenix mainly aims for
ultra-low write overhead while still enabling recovery of ToC
5
Solution ToC Recoverability Low Recovery Time Performance Overhead Write Overhead
Osiris [23] X Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable
Strict (TriadNVM [5]) X X X (very high) X (very high)
Anubis [1] X X X (high) X (high)
Phoenix X X X(low) X(low)
Table 1: Schemes comparison
integrity trees. The first observation that Phoenix builds
upon is that recovery of ToC integrity trees can be achieved
by recovering the lost content of security metadata cache.
While this observation has been also made in prior work, e.g.,
Anubis [1], enabling such a recovery of cache content has
been done in a way similar to write-through, by persisting the
writes made to security metadata cache into a shadow region
in the NVM, which has been proven to be very expensive
when used with NVMs [23]. However, Phoenix is based
on the fact that we can actually recover the cache content
without exact/accurate shadowing of all of its content. In this
paper, we make a novel observation and contribution that we
can securely recover the lost cache contents and verify them
while still relaxing the shadowing operation.
In particular, we observe that recovering ToC integrity trees
by relying on restoring the cache content before a crash has
two major requirements. First, there must be a mechanism to
verify that we recovered the most recent cache content before
a crash and its contents have not been tampered with. Second,
the root of the Merkle Tree must reflect the updates of all
memory including the cache contents just before a crash. By
ensuring these two requirements are satisfied, the security
metadata cache can be recovered and the rest of the memory
verification is verified through a Merkle Tree on each memory
access. In other words, simply bringing the metadata cache
and Merkle Tree root (unaffected) to the state before a crash
is sufficient to ensure crash consistency of security metadata.
Prior work, Anubis [1], achieved such a cache recovery
mechanism by relying on a reserved region in the NVM called
the shadow cache, in which any updates of a lazy-update
ToC metadata cache is copied, thus resulting in doubling the
writes. To ensure the integrity of the shadow cache, Anubis
applies a small Merkle Tree over the shadow cache while
keeping its root in the processor and following an eager up-
date scheme. After a crash, the cache content can be restored
from the shadow region and its integrity can be verified using
the small Merkle Tree (the eagerly updated one), which also
has its root kept in an NVM (or NVM-backed) register inside
the processor chip. On the other hand, Phoenix is mainly
based on the fact that most updates to metadata cache in
the lazy-update scheme are for leaves. However, shadow-
ing leaves updates to memory might be unnecessary if we
can have the following: 1 a mechanism to verify the most-
recent cache state including leaves but without necessarily
shadowing them, and 2 the ability to recover leave updates.
Phoenix employs state-of-the-art counter recovery schemes,
e.g., Osiris and phase-based recovery [23], to relax updates
to the shadow region in the cache while simultaneously al-
lowing to recover the exact content of the cache right before
a crash. Specifically, Phoenix selectively decides which se-
curity metadata should be shadowed strictly and which ones
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Figure 5: Updates Tracking
can be relaxed. Even though it relaxes the shadow region up-
date, Phoenix enables the reconstruction of the cache content
(including relaxed leaves) and allows the verification of re-
covering the exact content before a crash. Since most updates
to the security metadata cache are caused by leaves updates,
Phoenix is expected to significantly reduce the number of
writes while allowing fast recovery of ToC trees. The main
downside of Phoenix is that it requires additional work before
reconstructing the lost cache content and verifying it.
The rest of this section discusses the design details of
Phoenix. Note that the main distinction between Phoenix
and other schemes lies in Phoenix’s ability to recover the
exact cache content before a crash, although without a strict
shadowing of cache content to NVM. Phoenix is the first
scheme to enable lazy-update cache recovery without the
need to persist each security metadata cache update.
3.1 Selective Persistence
Upon a crash, the cache loses its contents. Losing the
cached security metadata results in integrity verification fail-
ure, thus the cached security metadata needs to be persisted.
Strictly persisting the security metadata incurs tens of ad-
ditional writes, and to avoid those unnecessary extra writes
we opt for persisting only the unrecoverable nodes of the
metadata. Security metadata contains the encryption counters
and the Merkle tree nodes, while ToC integrity tree nodes
are composed of 8 counters and a MAC calculated over the
8 counters and the parent of the node. Since the encryption
counters can be retrieved without strictly persisting them us-
ing Osiris [23], we are going to follow a similar scheme by
persisting the encryption counters with every N-th write, or
on eviction. On the other hand, the intermediate ToC nodes
are not recoverable, therefore we suggest persisting these
cached nodes to successfully recover from the crash. To
achieve that, we allocate a small region in the NVM which
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is the same size of the security metadata cache (about 256
kB) which we refer to as the Cache Mirror (CM). Whenever
an intermediate ToC node is written in the cache, this update
will be persisted and its address will be copied to the CM,
while updating the encryption counters with every N-th write.
Figure 5 shows how selective persistence is done, whenever
a write happens, if the write resulted in updating an interme-
diate node, the updated intermediate node is copied to the
CM region. During the recovery process, the contents of the
CM are used to recover the lost cache contents and refresh
the ToC to ensure a secure recovery process. Since the se-
curity region is defined by the boundaries of the processor,
the integrity of the CM should be guaranteed before it can
be used during the recovery. Thus, we apply a small Merkle
Tree (MT), four levels with an arity of eight, over the CM
while keeping the root of this tree in the processor. During
the recovery, the integrity of the CM region is verified by
building the CM-MT and comparing the resulting root with
the processor kept root.
3.2 Phoenix Operation
Phoenix read operation is merely a read and verify oper-
ation, and does not require any changes or special handling.
In particular, the read operation in Phoenix does not mod-
ify the security metadata cache except for eviction, which
is discussed in subsection 3.4. On the other hand, the write
operation results in an encryption counter increment to ensure
a new encryption pad for the modified block. The encryp-
tion counter increment will not affect the MAC value in the
node nor increment the parent as we are using a lazy update
scheme, but Phoenix will be triggered and the address of
the modified counter will be copied to the CM. However,
when an encryption counter block is evicted the parent node
should be fetched and both nodes should be updated. De-
spite using a lazy update scheme, it is important to persist
the encryption counter at every N-th (4th in Phoenix) write,
or on eviction to enable encryption counter recovery. It is
important to keep in mind that updates of ToC node and the
data are to be done atomically using the Write Pending Queue
(WPQ) and a ready bit as described earlier. While encryption
counters are updated at every N-th write, ToC intermediate
nodes need to be persisted each time they are modified, thus
the addresses of the intermediate nodes are copied to the CM,
and the intermediate nodes are persisted into the NVM.
3.3 Phoenix+ Operation
While Phoenix persists intermediate nodes on each update,
and persists encryption counters on N-th update or eviction.
Phoenix+ relaxes persisting encryption counters on eviction,
to only persist encryption counters on the N-th write. By
doing this, Phoenix+ reduces the number of writes and the
performance overhead significantly. Phoenix+ relies on re-
covering the encryption counters while working, by utiliz-
ing the encryption counters recovery scheme. Notice that,
recovering the encryption counters on the run might add per-
formance overhead if done in a sequential manner, but we
assume N-ECC engines (4 in our design) to retrieve the latest
value of the used encryption counter. Keep in mind, that evict-
ing an encryption counter without updating its value, does
not affect its parent, but still affect the encrypted data. Thus,
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the old encryption counter value integrity can be verified the
parent value, and the latest value can be recovered.
3.4 Eviction
The lazy update scheme we use in Phoenix reduces the
number of writes while relying on eviction to propagate the
nodes update. Figure 6 shows the eviction process. In the
case of a counter encryption cache miss, the memory con-
troller selects a victim block to be evicted from the cache
using the Least Recently Used (LRU) replacement policy.
The victim block is then inserted to the WPQ in case it was
an intermediate tree node. Note that we are not persisting the
encryption counter on eviction, since we are relying on Osiris
to retrieve the encryption counter’s most recent value while
running. Persisting the encryption counter on eviction will
improve the performance slightly, as we can immediately use
the fetched encryption counter after verifying its integrity, al-
though will increase the number of writes to the NVM. Since
our goal is to successfully recover the ToC while maintaining
a low number of writes, we opt for recovering the encryp-
tion counter while running by only persisting the encryption
counter at every N-th write. To ensure the data consistency
we assume the evicted encryption counter, intermediate ToC
node, data, and CM data are inserted atomically to the WPQ
as described in section 2.8.
3.5 Imprecise Cache Mirror
The Cache Mirror (CM) region, shown in Figure 7, is a
small reserved region in the NVM. The CM only contains the
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addresses of the dirty intermediate nodes and the addresses of
the dirty counters, while the actual dirty intermediate nodes
are persisted to their actual locations. The CM contents are
used to securely recover the system after a crash. To ensure
the integrity of recovery, the dirty cached intermediate nodes
and the dirty encryption counters are protected with a small
general MT. This small MT that only covers the dirty interme-
diate nodes and dirty encryption counters is eagerly updated,
and its root is always kept in the processor. Notice that by
relaxing the CM contents to contain only the addresses of
dirty intermediate nodes and the addresses of dirty encryption
counters, we were able to drop the number of writes signifi-
cantly. Moreover, using a small MT to cover only the dirty
intermediate nodes and dirty encryption counters, we were
able to drop the performance overhead. We note that when a
lazy update scheme is used, the root is no longer suitable as a
single point of memory content integrity verification. As a
matter of fact, the cache contents are the most updated nodes,
and the nodes are used to verify the integrity of fetched nodes.
When a crash happens, and the cached nodes are lost. How-
ever, we can recover the leaf nodes using encryption counters
recovery, although the integrity of these nodes needs to be
verified. The parents of these nodes can be either up-to-date
in the NVM, or cached nodes lost during the crash. Thus, we
make sure to persist the intermediate nodes, and use the small
MT root to ensure the integrity of cached intermediate nodes.
3.6 Integrity Verification
The secure region is defined by the processors boundary.
While on-chip memory is considered secure, that is not the
case with NVM. Thus, whenever a data block is fetched from
the NVM its integrity needs to be verified. To verify the
integrity of any block, its parent needs to be fetched and used
to calculate the MAC value of the verified block. However,
once the parent is fetched, its integrity needs to be verified
which will result in a recursive operation until the first parent
cache hit. Once one parent is found in the cache, its integrity
is considered to be verified, and is used to calculate the MAC
of the child node. If the calculated MAC value matches
the child node’s stored MAC value, the child’s integrity is
considered verified. For the CM region, since its size is
very limited (256 kB) it is more suitable to use an eagerly
updated MT and store its root in the processor. Using an
eagerly updating scheme means the root always reflects the
most recent tree state. The CM MT is four levels using 8-ary
tree, thus it is feasible to rebuild the tree during recovery and
compare with the stored root to verify its integrity.
3.7 Recovery
The recovery process starts by loading the pre-crach cached
intermediate nodes from the NVM, using the addresses saved
in the CM region. Then, the integrity of the loaded interme-
diate nodes is verified using the small MT root. When the
intermediate nodes are verified, any interrupted write opera-
tion is resumed, by checking the DONE_BIT and completing
the pending operations to successfully complete the atomic
write. Notice that the small MT root is eagerly updated, and
always kept in the processor. Moreover, the small MT root
is calculated over the dirty cached intermediate nodes, thus
its update is infrequent, since most of the updates are done
to the leaf nodes. In turn, the overhead of eagerly updating
the small MT root is negligible. Note that we are restoring
the encryption counter during the normal operation, and the
encryption counters are not persisted nor recovered during
the recovery process, since they are recovered when fetched.
Algorithm 1: Recovery Algorithm
Result: Recovered
1 Read CM content;
2 Load the intermediate nodes;
3 Load the encryption counters;
4 Recover the encryption counters;
5 Calculate small MT root and compare with processor
root;
6 if small MT root = processor stored root then
7 if DONE_BIT == 0 then
8 Move persistent registers content to WPQ;
9 Write WPQ contents;
10 end
11 Proceed normal operation;
12 else
13 Failed to recover;
14 end
Once the CM integrity is verified, the DONE_BIT is checked
and any pending write operations that were in the persistent
registers before the crash are moved to the WPQ and exe-
cuted. After the pending write operations are executed, the
CM contents are used to restore the cached intermediate ToC
nodes. While the intermediate ToC nodes are ensured to be
recovered to the most recent state using the CM, the encryp-
tion counters are not. To restore the encryption counter to
the most recent state, we use the CM contents to retrieve the
addresses of the cached encryption counters, then fetch the
counters and use Osiris to retrieve the most recent counter
value. After the encryption counters are updated to the most
recent values, the cache is restored to its previous state before
the crash, and its integrity can be verified using the small MT
root. Notice that in case of the CM region is tampered with,
and the calculated root of the CM region does not match the
stored root in the processor, the recovery process fails and
the integrity of the NVM is declared unverifiable.
3.8 Security Discussion
In traditional persistent secure systems, the security of the
data is protected using the counter mode encryption, and the
integrity of the encryption counters is protected with MT.
The root of the MT is always kept in the processor, and
memory content’s integrity is verified by calculating the root
and comparing it with the processor stored root. This scheme
works well for eagerly updated MT, which is not the case
in our scheme. Phoenix+ scheme relies on a lazy update
scheme, which means whenever a leaf counter is updated
or evicted we do not update the parent of the counter, nor
update the associated MAC with the leaf counter node, but
rely on the N-th write to the same counter to propagate the
update. In Figure 2, if the counter C01 is updated twice and
then got evicted, the parent node B00 will not be updated,
and the MAC value MAC00 will both be stale. Notice that
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Figure 8: Phoenix Extra Writes
even the counter B00 will be stale in the NVM, so the next
time counter C01 is fetched it still can be verified successfully
using the stale MAC00 and the parent B00, and then its most
recent value can be recovered using Osiris [23]. In the lazy
update scheme, the root of the ToC can be stale, and the most
updated state is preserved in the cached intermediate nodes of
the ToC. In the recovery process, it is essential to guarantee
the integrity of the CM region as it reflects the most recent
state of the tree. Thus, the integrity of the CM is protected
using a small BMT and the root is eagerly updated and kept
in the secure region (processor).
4. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our scheme based on the Write
Back scheme as the baseline, and compare it with state-
of-the-art scheme, Anubis [1]. We evaluate the additional
number of write incurred by each scheme, the performance of
Phoenix and Phoenix+ schemes, then we show the sensitivity
to cache size and recovery time.
4.1 Methodology
Evaluating our scheme was done using Gem5 simulator [6],
a cycle-level simulator. Table 2 shows the used configuration,
we simulate a 4-core X86 processor with 16GB PCM-based
Main Memory with parameters modeled as in [13]. The eval-
uation was done by running 9 applications from the SPEC
2006 benchmark suit [11]. The used benchmarks include
memory intensive applications in both read and write inten-
sive applications. For each application, we simulate 500M
instructions after fast forwarding to a representative region.
In our evaluation, we model the integrity-protection using
ToC, encryption aspects, security metadata cache, hash calcu-
lation latency, and cache mirror region integrity protection.
4.2 Phoenix Writes
Table 2: Configuration of the simulated system
Processor
CPU 4 Cores, X86-64, Out-of-Order, 1.00GHz
L1 Cache Private, 2 Cycles, 32KB,2-Way
L2 Cache Private, 20 Cycles, 512KB, 8-Way
L3 Cache Shared, 32 Cycles, 8MB, 64-Way
Cacheline Size 64Byte
DDR-based PCM Main Memory
Capacity 16GB
PCM Latencies Read 60ns, Write 150ns
Encryption Parameters
Security Metadata Cache 256KB, 8-Way, 64B Block
CM in Phoenix 256KB
CM in Phoenix+ 256KB
Persistence Limit 4
To evaluate our scheme, we compared the number of writes
incurred for each of the following schemes. 1) Write Back
(Baseline): This is a simple ToC integrity tree scheme with
write back. This system only writes on eviction and does
not provide any recoverability. 2) Anubis SGX: The Anubis
scheme for ToC integrity tree updates the ToC lazily and
writes all the ToC updates to a shadow region. 3) Phoenix:
This scheme updates the ToC lazily while persisting the up-
dates for intermediate ToC nodes, and relaxes the updates
for leaf nodes until eviction or the counter is written N times.
4) Phoenix+: This scheme reduces the number of writes in
Phoenix by only persisting the leaf nodes on the Nth write,
and relies on a counter recovery scheme (Osiris [23]) to re-
cover the counters on the run.
Figure 8 shows the number of writes incurred by the above
schemes. Considering the Write Back as the baseline scheme,
we notice that Anubis incurs an average of 87% extra writes,
while Phoenix incurs an average of 12.9% extra writes, and
Phoenix+ reduces the writes to less than the write-back by
an average of 3.8%. Phoenix+ reduces the number of writes
to less than Write Back scheme while achieving the recover-
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Figure 9: Phoenix Performance
ability of ToC. Phoenix+ achieves this reduction by utilizing
the lazy update scheme for the ToC, and by eliminating the
eviction writes for the encryption counter nodes, while us-
ing Osiris counter recovery to recover the latest value of the
encryption counter each time it is fetched.
4.3 Phoenix Performance
To evaluate Phoenix, we model and compare the afore-
mentioned four schemes. Figure 9 illustrates Phoenix’s per-
formance in comparison to other schemes. Considering the
Write Back scheme as the baseline, Anubis provides the abil-
ity to recover the ToC with 7.9% extra performance overhead.
Phoenix is not only capable of recovering the ToC, but also
achieves a performance of 0.8% better than the write back
scheme. That is, Phoenix+’ performance is less than the
Write Back scheme, thus Phoenix+ reduces the overhead
by 8.7% compared to Anubis. For instance, we notice, also
from Figure 9, that Phoenix in both versions is performing
better than the baseline for CACTUS benchmark. Moreover,
using memory intensive benchmarks shows that Phoenix+
performs slightly better than the Write Back scheme, while
this difference is expected to be more noticeable with less
memory intensive applications. Phoenix reduces the over-
head by relying on lazily updating the ToC while persisting
each update to the intermediate ToC nodes. Notice that rely-
ing on the lazy update reduces the frequency of updating the
intermediate nodes until the leaf node is evicted. On the other
hand, Phoenix+ takes one step further to relax persisting the
leaf counters on eviction and relies on Osiris as a counter
recovery scheme to recover the counters while running.
4.4 Sensitivity Study
4.4.1 Recovery TimeSystem recovery of ToC protected systems was not possi-
ble except for strict persisting scheme, until recently. Anu-
bis [1], Phoenix, and Phoenix+ allow the recovery in less
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than a second, due to making the recovery time a function
of the cache size instead of the memory size. While Anu-
bis [1] relies on a lazy strict persistent scheme which results
in extra 87% extra writes to achieve the recoverability of the
ToC integrity protected systems in the same time as Phoenix
requires to recover the same NVM. Figure 10 shows the re-
covery time of Anuibs and Phoenix+ regarding the cache size.
Figure 10 shows that both schemes achieve a recovery time of
less than a second, even for extremely large cache size (4MB)
Phoenix recovery time is ≈0.12 seconds for Phoenix+ and
≈0.015 seconds for Anubis. Notice that Phoenix+ recovery
time is higher than Anubis scheme as it requires retrieving
the leaf counters values during the recovery process. For this
sensitivity test, the worst case scenario is considered to calcu-
late the recovery time, by considering all the eight counters
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in each leaf node are stale. We notice that Phoenix+ trades a
very small amount of recovery time for reducing performance
overhead and the number of writes of the system.
4.4.2 Performance Sensitivity to Cache Size
Phoenix+ allows the recovery of ToC integrity protected
NVM as a function of the cache size. To fully evaluate the
scheme, we vary the cache size and measure the performance
overhead of our scheme. As shown in Figure 11, the per-
formance of Phoenix+ almost stays the same. This can be
explained by Phoenix operation; Phoenix+ performs in a man-
ner similar to the baseline (Write Back). However, Phoenix+’
performance depends on the number of writes to cached data:
the more writes to the cached data will result in more counter
writes, which results in more Phoenix writes.
4.4.3 Counter Persistence Limit
The number of writes on which the encryption counter is
persisted clearly affects the performance of Phoenix. Using
a large number of writes before the encryption counter is
persisted reduces the number of writes and the performance
overhead. However, this comes at a cost: a large persis-
tency limit would cause higher recovery time and higher
performance overhead as the counter latest value needs to
be recovered each time its fetched or during recovery. The
performance overhead can be avoided by using multiple ECC
engines to recover the counter value. In our design, we opt
for using the 4th write to be the persistence limit, choosing
to persist the counter at the 4th write provides a very low
performance overhead and enables the recovery within less
than a second.
5. RELATED WORK
The most related work to Phoenix are Anubis [1], Triad-
NVM [5], Osiris [23], and Crash Consistency [16]. Anubis
[1] addresses the recovery time of NVM systems and uses a
shadow region to track down all the changes to cache contents,
where each writes to the cache results in a write to the shadow
region. The shadow region facilitates recovering the cache
contents in ultra-low time, but incurs 87% extra writes for
ToC. Triad-NVM [5], on the other hand, discusses the trade-
off between recovery time and performance, and reduces
the recovery time by persisting N levels of the MT. On the
downside, Triad-NVM does not work with ToC, and requires
persisting multiple levels of the integrity tree.
To recover counters, Osiris [23] relies on the ECC-bits as
a sanity check for the used encryption counter. By applying a
stop-loss mechanism, Osiris restores the encryption counters
using a limited number of trials. Osiris works for retrieving
the encryption counters while assuming building the integrity
tree is possible, which is not the case with ToC integrity
tree. Crash Consistency [16] for counters recovery proposes
an API for programmers to selectively persist counters, and
ensures atomicity through a write queue and Ready-Bit. In
order to reduce the overhead, it proposes selective counter
atomicity of the persistent applications. The scheme depends
on the amount of applications persistent data and does not
address the recoverability issue of ToC.
There are several state-of-the-art works done in NVM se-
curity and persistence [8, 12, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27] without
considering the crash-consistency and recovery that discusses
to optimize the run-time overhead of implementing security
to NVM. Most works employ counter-mode encryption for
encrypting data and MT for ensuring integrity. However, to
the best of our knowledge, none of the works consider the re-
covery and crash-consistency of integrity protected systems.
As a matter of fact, any work that does encryption coun-
ters compression or increases the integrity tree arity boosts
our scheme, by increasing the cacheability of the encryp-
tion counters and reducing the number of intermediate nodes.
SecPM [27] proposes a write-through mechanism for the
counter cache that tries to combine multiple updates of coun-
ters to a single write to memory, however, does not ensure
recovery for ToC and incurs significant recovery time as in
Osiris. While Anubis [1] discusses the reduction of recovery
time of secure non-volatile memory and recovery mechanism
for ToC, however; the scheme incurs almost 2x extra writes
which reduces the NVM lifetime by half.
6. CONCLUSION
Phoenix is based on four observations, first, most updates
of the lazily updated ToC are done to leaf nodes. Second,
leaf nodes are the least likely to be evicted as they will be
reused frequently for verification and update purposes. Third,
leaf nodes can be recovered using any encryption counter
recovery scheme, we used Osiris in our work, but any other
scheme should work. Fourth, cached intermediate nodes can
be persisted at their location instead of being copied to the
shadow region, and the small MT only needs to cover the dirty
cached intermediate nodes and the dirty encryption counters.
Phoenix achieves recoverability with ultra-low recovery time
while keeping the number of writes to the minimum in ToC
integrity protected NVMs. Our solution achieves a significant
improvement in the number of writes as it reduces the number
of writes by 90.8% less than state-of-the-art scheme Anubis,
and 3.8% less than the write back scheme, with a recovery
time of less than a second in ToC integrity protected systems.
In addition, Phoenix recovery time and extra writes are a
function of the cache size, as it works by recovering the lost
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cached ToC nodes. In summary, Phoenix recovers the ToC in
less than a second, reduces the number of writes significantly,
and improves the performance.
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